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Summary
Blockchain sharding is a promising approach to solving the dilemma between decen-
tralization and high performance (transaction throughput) for blockchain. The main
challenge of blockchain sharding systems is how to reach a decision on a statement
among a subgroup (shard) of people while ensuring the whole population recognizes
this statement. Namely, the challenge is to prevent an adversary who does not have
the majority of nodes globally but have the majority of nodes inside a shard. Most
blockchain sharding approaches canonly reach a correct consensus inside a shardwith
at most n∕3 evil nodes in a n node system. There is a blockchain sharding approach
which can prevent an incorrect decision to be reached when the adversary does not
have n∕2 nodes globally. However, the system can be stopped from reaching consen-
sus (become deadlocked) if the adversary controls a smaller number of nodes. In this
article, we present an improved Blockchain sharding approach that can withstand n∕2
adversarial nodes and recover from deadlocks. The recovery is made by dynamically
adjusting the number of shards and the shard size. A performance analysis suggests
our approach has a high performance (transaction throughput) while requiring little
bandwidth for synchronization.
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1 INTRODUCTION
During the thrive of Cryptocurrency in the past 10 years, researchers presented various kinds of distributed ledgers, for example, permission-
less blockchain,1-3 directed acyclic graph (DAG).4-6 Many are working on extending the usage of permissionless blockchain to power Decentralized
AutonomousOrganizations (DAOs)7 orDecentralizedAutonomousCompanies (DAC),8 whichgather theanonymous resources throughout thenet-
work tocollectivelyperformtestswithoutanycentralizedmanagerand the result integrity is guaranteed.Forexample, byusingascalableblockchain
as the foundation technology, a data grid or distributed database can outsource the jobs to the users. Many IoT devices (eg, Amazon assistants,
Google home services) on the one hand, live in the centre of people's privacy (eg, home, office), while on the other hand they require a significant
amount of data being sent to the cloud for analysis. Blockchain may help IoT devices function in a decentralized manner following a well-defined
protocol (smart contract), while reaping the benefits of big data and alleviating the concern over privacy or even espionage.
However, ithasbeena long-standingquestionhowtoopenthemembership inadistributedsystemwhilemaintaining theperformance, integrity,
and correctness of the distributed job results.9 Traditional blockchains can only process a limited number of transactions per second, and the
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decentralizationwill be compromised if the number of transactions per second is increased. Addingmoreworkload to existing devices in a network
would force the resource-constrained devices, which are already exhausted to download and verify updates happening throughout the network
continually. Of course, the participants can ease the work burden and increase the reward rate by indirectly mining through mining pools where
theminimal computation power is gathered and used collectively by one representative. However, themining pool participants cannotmake a judg-
ment on the way their computation power is used, and as a result, the system becomes more centralized, which we would like to avoid. Various
approaches have been explored in hopes of solving the blockchain's scalability problem, out of these approaches,4,6,10-15 Blockchain sharding13 is a
promising one.
Blockchain sharding is a method that splits the transactions amongst all the participating nodes. By allowing multiple node committees to
process incoming transactions in parallel, a sharding-based blockchain protocol can increase its throughput with the increase of the number of
participants joining the network. Blockchain sharding has also been used to reduce the storage requirement for nonsharded blockchains,16 which
helps the blockchain to be implemented in IoT devices that are lacking storage space. Financial models17 can be built into the blockchain sharding
approach to link thedigital labor and themarket behaviorwith the changes in pay and service prices. Blockchain sharding can also increase the secu-
rity of blockchain systems by strengthening decentralization. A recent analysis18 shows more than 36% of bitcoin nodes are now hosted on only
five primary cloud services: This phenomenon can raise a high-security concern, as the cloud services can shut down the bitcoin network suddenly.
By employing blockchain sharding, many more users can host blockchain nodes in resource-constrained devices with less processing power than
mining-specialized devices and participate as independentminers in blockchain's mining game.
An important aim when designing a blockchain sharding architecture is to reduce the chance for many adversary nodes to be assigned into
the same sub-network. Situations in which the adversary does not hold the majority in the whole network but dominates a subnetwork should
be strictly prevented to safeguard the entire blockchain system. Elastico19 is known as the first sharding-based consensus protocol designed for
blockchain. Elastico has several drawbacks: first, all nodes need to reset their identities after every iteration, and all the committees (shards) are
rebuilt. Second, the latency increases linearly with the increase of the network size because it requires much more time to fill up all the shards by
solving enough PoWs. Third, the process of the committee selection can be misled by the adversary: the adversary can pre-compute PoW puzzles.
Fourth, the probability of failure is primarily increased because a small-sized committee (of around 100 members) is required to restrict the run-
ning practical adversary fault tolerance (PBFT)20 in each committee. Elastico has beenproved tobe insecure in practice,13 and the failure probability
can be as high as 0.97 after merely six iterations. Every block must be broadcast to all parties, though Elastico allows each participant only to ver-
ify a subset of transactions. OmniLedger13 improves on Elastico, but it can only tolerate n∕4 adversary nodes;13,21 its security is safeguarded by a
large number of participants inside a shard. Due to the limited number of shards, the ceiling of transaction throughput is still relatively low over-
all. As there aremultiple levels of committees, several elections are needed for the system to form this contribution, which slows down the system.
RSCoin22 is a sharding-based protocol for helping centrally-banked cryptocurrencies to scale. It is an approach to combine a distributed network
with a centralized monetary supply bringing transparency to the traditional centralized banking systems. However, it relies on a trusted source.
RSCoin is not adversary fault-tolerant because each shard runs on a two-phase committee protocol. RapidChain21 improves the security threshold
to n∕3 adversary node resistant; however, the shard size is still significant.
Wepreviouslyproposedanewapproach23 that classifies thenodes intodifferent classes andmaintains thenumberof nodesofdifferent classes
in every shard. This approach raises the security level of Blockchain sharding to n∕2 adversary node resistant, andmostly shrinks the shard size and
improves the throughput. However, every shard must have one and only one node from each class, the global rearrangement of the nodes is often
needed when the nodes of some classes of a shard go offline. Many new nodes might be left in a pending state when there are not enough nodes
from different classes to form new shards. The shard number does not fit into the data flow so that the shard size is only relevant to the number
of nodes in the system instead of the real-time workload. It might result in a situation where many shards have no tests to run while the system
is idle, and there are not enough shards when the system is busy. Furthermore, the system might be halted by the adversary who has at least
(m − T + 1) × (n∕m) of nodes when the system of n nodes rules that the consensus in a shard sizedm is reachedwith approval from at least T nodes
in that shard.
In this article, we present a flexible n∕2 adversary node resistant blockchain protocol that can adjust the class number, shard number, and shard
size based on the workload. Our design in this article serves as the extension of our previous work,23 and it solves the halting problem in that work
when the adversary has fewer than n∕2 of nodes.We can achieve the security levels of both the n∕2 tamper-resistant and n∕2 halting resistant. Our
protocol not only increases the security level compared to other methods at n∕3 security level at most but it also increases the number of shards
and reduces the size of shards.With an increased shard number (more shards running in parallel, and less workload per shard) and a reduced shard
size (the less numberof nodes in the shard, less communication amongnodes in the shard),we strengthen thedecentralization (universal joinability)
and increase the performance of the blockchain.
In the remaining of the article, we first discuss a traditional blockchain sharding approach in Section 1.1. We then discuss the n∕2 adversary
resistant blockchain sharding approach in Section 2, and why it may be deadlocked when the adversary has (m − T + 1) × (n∕m) of nodes. We then
propose a new blockchain sharding approach in Section 3, which can recover from a deadlock (global halting) and achieve the n∕2 halting resistant
security level. In Section 4, we show results from a data and performance analysis, discussing the performance (transaction throughput) and the
data requirement for nodes.
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t = n/ 3 = t666 = n/ 2 = 1000
F I GURE 1 The chance to fail when n = 2000, t = n∕3, t = n∕2, andm = n∕swhere s is the number of shards
1.1 Blockchain sharding hypothesis
If people are inside of a forest recording the timewhen trees fall to the ground, there is no need for everyone in the forest to hear and record every
fall tomaintain the fairness and integrity of the record. The fact that a tree falls and the timewhena tree falls is correctwhen it is recognizedbymost
people around the tree, assuming these people have not colluded.With a sufficient number of people, if they are assigned randomly and distributed
to subareas in the forest and are relocated timeby time to avoid the accumulationof adversary power, collusion is hard tohappen (expected tooccur
in hundreds of years).
In particular, this proposal is secure when (i) only people assigned to a subarea of the forest can record the information about this subarea. (ii)
No person can control or predict which subarea theywill be assigned to. (iii) The assignment follows a globally recognized rule, not by the arbitrary
willing of some specific group of superior people. (iv) People are periodically reassigned. (v) The number of people in every shard is a sufficient size.
When people assume there is a sufficient number of people acting honestly, people would only need to check what is the typically recognized
timeof falling for a treeof their interest fromthe subareawhere this treebelongs. It is not necessary for themselves tohear the falling. In this regard,
people do not need to have excellent hearing ability when the forest is dense. Instead, they only need to focus on monitoring the subarea in which
they are assigned to.
The challenges in this model are as follows: (i) How to distribute people to subareas in a decentralized and unpredictable way? (ii) How can
people determine if a record of a subarea is made by people assigned to that area? (iii) Without monitoring what happened in a subarea, how can
people outside know if the majority of the population in that area support a record or not? (iv) How large is a population and how many subareas
does the forest need tomake a “collusion” unlikely to happen?
1.2 Failure probability
Assuming there existmethods to solve all or some of these challenges above, we calculate the probability of a “collusion” to happen. The probability
of obtaining no less than X adversary nodes when randomly picking a shard sized m (m is the number of nodes inside the shard) can be calcu-
lated by the cumulative hypergeometric distribution functionwithout replacement from a population of n nodes. Let X denote the random variable
corresponding to the number of adversary nodes in the sampled shard. The failure probability for one shard is at most:
Pr[X > [m∕2]] =
m∑
X=[m∕2]
(t
X
)(n−t
m−X)
(nm)
, (1)
which calculates the probability that no less than X nodes are adversary in a shard sized m and the adversary has t number of nodes globally in a
system of n nodes. Rapidchain21 is designedwith this failure probability.
Figure 1 shows themaximum probability to fail with n = 2000 andm = n∕s, where s is the number of shards.
As can be seen from the result, the system has a very high failure chancewhen the adversary taken n∕2 of nodes. The high failure probability is
themain reasonwhymost blockchain sharding approaches can only withstand up to n∕3 of nodes being evil, and the shard sizemust be enormous.
2 N∕2 BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING APPROACH
2.1 Hypothesis
We proposed a n∕2 adversary node resistant blockchain sharding approach23 using a different Hypothesis to build the model. In this hypothesis,
nodes are juries inside the courtrooms, and a sentence is made when more than a predefined T number of people inside the jury sizedm reached
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Occupation I II III IV V
A
B
C E
D F G H I
Number of Pending people 4 2 1 1 1
Note: Letters in red colors are the pending people. Following
the alphabetical order, the letters also reflect the timewhen
people report to the office.
TAB L E 1 The pending queue published by the court office at moment 1
Occupation I II III IV V
U V
A Q R S T
Add to court system -> B M N O P
C E J K L
D F G H I
Number of Pending people 4 4 5 4 5
Note: Letters in the blue color represent the people who
reported to the office after moment 1 beforemoment 2. Some
nodes will be added to the system afterward because the
minimum length of the queues is equal to four (pre-defined
adding parameters).
TAB L E 2 The pending queue after moment 1 beforemoment 2
a consensus, T > m
2
. In order to make the sentences convincing, people inside the jury come from different occupations; united they represent the
whole of society. Assuming the rule says a jury should have five people, a teacher, a social worker, a doctor, a businessman, and a police officer. There
are five teachers, five social workers, five doctors, five business-people, and five police officers for five juries to run in parallel. The Jury hypothesis is
different from the Foresthypothesis because if the adversary controls twodoctors, they cannot live inside the same jury.However, they can be inside
the same sub-area of the forest when recording the time of the tree falling.
The challenge of the Jury hypothesis is (i) How to give every node a different occupation; and (ii) How to make the nodes equally divided into
different occupations.
2.2 Membershipmanagement
Let there be a shard acting as the court officewhich in charge of Jury schedule arrangement.We refer a pending person as the personwho reported
to the court office but has not been assigned to a court. Pending people can claim their occupations when reporting to the court office, and they
cannot change the occupations once they are assigned into a court. The court office periodically publishes the number of pending people in every
occupation. Line up the number of pending people in every occupation in ascending order of the timewhen they claimed an occupation. Every time
there comes F pending people in every occupation, the front F people in every occupation is added to the courts. In themeantime, Fmore courts are
formed, andall the jurors are reassigned intodifferent courts.Whenassigningpeople, the court office canalsobe seenas a court.Namely, every time
the juror membership is adjusted, the people inside the court office is also reassigned to other courts. If a pending person changes its occupation,
it will go to the tail of the other pending queue, losing the position in the original pending queue. Thus, we expect new participants to check the
pendingqueueof everyoccupation and choose anunpopular occupation to get into the courts quicker.Otherwise, theywill be kept in pending status
longer until other people fill in unpopular occupations. As new participants line in the shorter queues, the number of people in every occupation is
automatically close to each other (tend to be equal in the long run). The person, regardless if they are inside a court or in the waiting queue, should
work (generate PoWs in the case of blockchain) in every fixed time window so that the adversary who has half of the overall energy can only have
half of the people in the system.
Tables 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 show the procedure of adding people into the system. In this procedure, we rule that whenever there are at least four
pending people in every occupation, the adding starts (F = 4). Table 1 shows the pending queue published by the court office inmoment one. Table 2
shows the pending queue when the adding conditions are met after moment one and before moment two. Table 3 shows the pending queue in
moment two. Table 4 shows the people in the court systemat inmoment one. Table 5 shows the people in the court systemat themoment twowhere
some new people are added.
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TAB L E 3 The pending queue published by the court office at moment 2
Occupation I II III IV V
U V
Number of Pending people 0 0 1 0 1
Note: Selected people in Table 2 has been assigned to the
system.
TAB L E 4 People in the court system atmoment 1
Ocp∖Court 1
Occupation I !
Occupation II @
Occupation III #
Occupation IV $
Occupation V *
Note: There is only one jury
running.
TAB L E 5 People in the court system atmoment 2
Ocp∖Court 1 2 3 4 5
Occupation I A C B D !
Occupation II @ Q M F E
Occupation III R N # J G
Occupation IV S O H K $
Occupation V T * P I L
Note: All memberships are adjusted with four more juries formed.
TAB L E 6 Court jury schedule
Ocp∖Court 0 1 2 3 4
Occupation I A A A A A
Occupation II H A H A H
Occupation III A H A H A
Occupation IV H A H H A
Occupation V H H H H A
As can be seen from the adding procedure, if the adversary is not in a very long pending queue, there is no gain for the adversary to change the
occupation once it reports to the court office. If it does so, it goes to the tail of another queue, leaving its original place to others. With a sufficient
number of participants, only an insignificant number of people will be left outside the system eventually.
2.3 Failure probability
Table 6 shows a court schedule table for five courts run in parallel with the jury sized five (five people in different occupations). A refers to an
adversary person.H refers to an honest person.
For a s number of courts to be held in parallel, there is an s number of people in each occupation. To manipulate a sentence in of a court, the
adversarymust gain control of at least T people inside this court. Because the adversary not havingmore than N
2
of people globally and T > m
2
, so
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F I GURE 2 The chance to fail with different swhen n = 2000 andm = n∕swhere s is the number of shards
T × s > t, (2)
where t is the number of adversary persons. If the adversary hasAi number of the person in occupation i, then the chance for the adversary to secure
amanipulated sentence is (assuming it place all the adversary person in the front T occupations):
Pr[T] =
T∏
i=1
Ai
s
. (3)
To derive themaximized value ofPr[T], wewant
∏T
i=1 Ai to bemaximized because s is the samenumber (every occupation has s people inside the
system). If the adversary has t number of people inside the system (Court Jury Schedule), then
t =
m∑
i=1
Ai. (4)
To let the value of
∏T
i=1 Ai maximized, we consider
Ai = ⌈(t∕T)⌉, i ∈ [1, t mod T] (5)
Ai = ⌊(t∕T)⌋, i ∈ (t mod T, T]. (6)
This scenario is maximized because given any positive integer X,
X∗X > (X − 1) ∗ (X + 1) = X ∗ X − 1. (7)
Thus,
Pr[T]max ≈
(
t
T ∗ s
)T
. (8)
Although the adversary cannotmanipulate a sentencewhen it does not have T people inside a shard, it can halt a sentence to be reachedwhen
it hasm-T+1numberof thenodes in a shard. This sentence cannot thenbemadeuntil the next court (the groupof juries is re-selected). Thus, tomake
the system functionmore smoothly, wewant T ≈ [m∕2]whilemeeting the security threshold (eg, 10−6 failure chance). Figure 2 shows themaximum
failure chance with different s,n = s∗m = 2000, T = 0.7∗m, and t = 1000 (1∕2 fraction of the overall population).
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, the Jury hypothesis largely outperforming the forest hypothesis even when there are n∕2 of evil nodes in the Jury
hypothesis and only n∕3 of evil nodes in the forest hypothesis.When n = 2000, if maintaining a 10−6 failure chance, Jury (n∕2 evil nodes) can have 33
shards at the same time, while forest (n∕3 evil nodes) can only have 10 shards.
2.4 Drawbacks
Thesystemasawhole ishaltedwhentheadversary took s × (m − T + 1)ofnodes, and itplacesall of thesenodes into thesamem − T + 1occupations.
In this scenario, it is guaranteed that the adversary hasm − T + 1 of nodes inside every shard. Table 7 shows a example of a system halting, where
m = 5 and T = 4, the adversary tookm − T + 1 number of nodes in every shard.
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TAB L E 7 A halted scenerio
Ocp∖Court 0 1 2 3 4
Occupation I A A A A A
Occupation II A A A A A
Occupation III H H H H H
Occupation IV H H H H H
Occupation V H H H H H
F I GURE 3 The color spectrum and basecolors
Because the court office (the shardwhichdealswith thenodemembership) is also stopped fromgenerating further blocks that canbe approved
by T people inside it, the pending nodes cannot be added to the system. Thus, though the n∕2Blockchain shardingmethod secured the system from
tampering when the adversary is below n∕2, the system can stop functioning anymore when s × (m − T + 1) of nodes are evil.
3 FLEXIBLE N∕2 BLOCKCHAIN SHARDING APPROACH
In this section, we introduce a flexible n∕2 blockchain sharding approach that can dynamically adjust m in shards to defeat the adversary. It takes
n∕2 nodes for the adversary to tamper a record or halt the system eventually.
3.1 Hypothesis
We use a new hypothesis named color hypothesis. It is ruled that every node should claim a color from the color spectrum when joining in the
system—every node inside a shard is categorized to its closet base color. If there is a m number of nodes inside a shard, then there is a m number
of base colors globally which together represent the color spectrum as a whole. The same as the Jury hypothesis, a consensus of a shard should be
approved by at least a predefined T people (T must larger than 0.5 ×m) inside this shard. Figure 3 shows the example of the base color. Every base
color should have the samenumber of nodes inside. This hypothesis is different from the jury hypothesis because the jury hypothesis requires a fixed
number of occupations, however, this hypothesis can regroup a color to a different base color based on the change of the number of basecolors.
The challenge of color hypothesis is to make the number of nodes in every categorization the same as each other, especially with the rapid
changes in the number of categorizations.
3.2 Failure probability
Let the adversary nodes has a t = n
2
− 1 number of nodes. The chance for the adversary to take control of a shard in a system,which has n nodes and
mbase color is:
Pr[T]max =
(
t
T × s
)T
=
(
t∕T
n∕m
)T
≈
(
m
2 × T
)T
. (9)
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F I GURE 4 T/m for maintaining a 10−6 failure chance with differentm
As can be seen from Figure 4, T can be adjusted by the number of m when maintaining a fixed threshold failure chance. When m is over 800,
T∕m is very close to 0.5 (the adversary needs to take approximately n∕2 of nodes to halt the system).We aim to dynamically adjustm to increase the
difficulty for the adversary in deadlocking a shard.
3.3 Model
We run a committee to deal with the membership issues (the same to the court office in Jury hypothesis). The new nodes report to the committee
andwait for the assignment. The committee's block contains two sections.
• Pending node section. The node information of nodes which reported to the committee before but have not yet assigned to a shard.
• Member node section. The node information of nodes inside each shard.
When a node wants to join the system, the node will check the information in the “pending node” section and the information in the Member
node section. It then selects a color code that is more likely to be added to the system. It then tells the committee the color code it chooses and its
public identity key. When a node's information is added to the “pending node” section, it needs to continuously send a PoW to the committee per
iteration to maintain its spot in the section until it is assigned. After the node is assigned to a shard, it also needs to present one PoW per iteration.
In this way, we prevented the node simulation problem: if the adversary has 50% of the overall power, it can only simulate n∕2 of nodes. The system
will add the pending nodes to make the number of shards fulfilling the current workload. There is a number of pending transactions indicated in
the block header of every shard. We predefine a standard workload K which is also written in the block header of every shard. When the pending
transactionof a shardexceeds2K there shouldbeonemore shard added to the system. If thepending transaction is below K
2
, then the systemshould
cut this shard. In this way, a shard has at least K/2workload and at most 2Kworkload.
Let there bem = n
s
color categorizations currently.
Let
mt = n + snp
st
, (10)
where st is the ideal number of shards in the systembased on the currentworkload, snp is the number of pending nodes that should be added to the
system for the systemtoachieve stnumberof shards (snp canbe zero), andmt is thenumberof color categorizations corresponding to that situation.
Find a snp number of nodes from the pending nodes that after adding these pending nodes, there can be st number of shards with each shard sized
mt. If such snp number of nodes are found, then the shard number is adjusted to st, and the selected nodes are added. The deselected nodes remain
in the pending section. If there is more than one snp possible, then it should select the largest snp.
If a node inside a shard did not show a PoW in an iteration, it is labeled as offline, and this information is written into the next block
header of that shard. All the shards (including the committee) synchronize the block headers of the blocks in other shards, and these blocks
should have at least T approvals in the relevant shards. Then, the committee updates its “member node” section using such information. When
a block of a shard is not approved by at least T people inside this shard in a fixed time frame (eg, 10 minutes), the block is abandoned. The
leader of the next block height will create a new block, and people will vote again for this new block. If the shard cannot reach a consen-
sus in a longer fixed time frame, the shard is halted. All shards know if a shard has halted because they sync the qualified block headers of
other shards and the block of the committee. If a shard is halted, the membership of all shards is rearranged (without adjusting the shard
number).
If the system is halted (every shard is halted for a fixed time, at the same time), then thenodesuse thenode information in the committee's latest
block to calculate a st<s that can make every base color of a st number of basecolor containsmt number of nodes. If such snp is not found, then the
shard size is directly reduced to one (all the nodes are inside the same shard). If there exists a snp (snp can be zero), then the system is rearranged
to st number of shards. By adjusting the number of color categorizations, we bring more shards so that T is respectively reduced. At the extreme,
when the shard size is one, the system can withstand the adversary that has a n/2-1 number of nodes. Specially if it is s = 1, then there is no color
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F I GURE 5 Themodel
categorization restriction (number of nodes inside every categorization can be different).When the system recovers from the halting problem, the
shard number can then be increased base on the data flow again. Figure 5 shows an illustration of themodel.
3.4 Node assignment
We refer to the committee as Shard 0, and other shards also have their unique shard id. When assigning/rearranging nodes, let CHash be the block
header hash of the latest block (including the signatures of the nodes) that has been approved by at least T number of nodes in the Shard 0. Let ID[i][j]
be the public identity key of the node in color categorization i in the j shard. Let “hash” be a hash function that returns a 2256 Integer, we calculate a
RID, where
RID[i][j] = CHash hash ID[i][j]. (11)
Rank every public key in ID[i] by the ascending order of RID[i] and then the new assignment will be completed.
3.5 Pending node selection and node categorization
Rank all the nodes in the “pending node” section and nodes in the “Member node” section together into a list by the increasing order of their color
code. If node x is originally from the “pending node” section then D(x) = 1, otherwise D(x) = 0. Let F[x][y] denote the node assignment scheme for
grouping nodes which are selected from the front x nodes in the ranked list; each group should have y people inside it.
F[x][y] = Max(F[i ∈ [y...x − y]][y], select(i, x, y)), (12)
where select is a function that takes y numberof nodes from thenode i to node x. The selection rule is: (i) ifD(x) = 0, then thenode xmust be selected.
(ii) Node x should be selected insteadof node x1 if node xhas been continuouslywritten in the “pending node” section longer thannode x1.Max(a, b)
is a function that: (i) calculates the number of nodes from the pending node section in assignment scheme a and b; and (ii) returns a or bwhich has a
larger number in step (i).
After the iterations, theassignment scheme inMax(F[st..n][st]) is thenewnodeassignment scheme. If suchanassignment schemedoesnotexist,
we do not add the pending nodes into the system in that round of the mining game. If the system is halted, then the color categorization is auto-
matically re-grouped toMax(F[ss..n][ss]), where ss is the largest one in ss<s that make a F[ss..n][ss] exist. The system then automatically rearranges
people following the rule discussed in themodel section. In this way, the systemwill eventually recover from the halt, at the extreme, when ss = 1.
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F I GURE 6 Theminimum percentage of nodes required to halt a shard
3.6 Shard consensus and global consensus
Let the block header hash of shard i in the block height BH be Blockhash[i][BH]. Li is the random leader of a shard i in BH+1
Li = (hash(Blockhash[i − 5][BH], · · · ,Blockhash[i + 5][BH]) mod m). (13)
Specially,
Blockhash[j][BH] = Blockhash[abs(NS − j)][BH], j ∈ [−4,0] ∪ [NS + 1,NS + 4]. (14)
If the shard i did not reach a consensus on the block height BH, then
Blockhash[i][BH] = Blockhash[i][BH − 1]. (15)
When the leader proposed a block Bob, all the nodes inside the shard will sync Bob and do the verification. If they approve Bob, they will sign
Bob using their private identity key and attach a PoW which fulfils the difficulty they claimed before. If a node does not approve Bob, it will not send
the signature, but it still needs to send the PoW.When a block receives a higher than T number of signature aswell as the corresponding PoWs, then
this block (Bob) is approved. If a node did not show the PoW, then this node is considered offline and its info iswritten to the block header of the next
block. Later this node's informationwill be synchronized by the committee, and this node is erased from the “member node” section.
A detect then verify mechanism is used for the global synchronous. The nodes of a shard will inform other shards when more than T nodes
approved a block of this shard. Then the nodes of the other shards will download the block header of this block. If a node in this shard is opposing
this block, itwill inform the other shards.When a conflict is detected, the honest nodes in this shardwill send the signatures of this block to the other
shards for verification. Other shardswill accept this block if there are at least T number of signatures signed by different nodes in this shard. If there
is no conflict reportedwithin a given time frame, then other shards will recognize this block as a finally accepted block of this shard.
All shards can simply verify the signatures received to determine the genuine because all nodes sync the block of the committee; they know
all the public keys of nodes. To prevent the adversaries from causing additional verification, the node that sends the global consensus information
should sign the data using its private key. In this way, the dishonest node can be labelled as offline directly after the verification.
4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSES AND DATA REQUIREMENT
In Figure 6, we show the minimum percentage of nodes which must be taken by the adversary to halt the entirety of the systemwith the different
number of Shards in two systems of 1500nodes and20000nodes.We can observe from the result that if the adversary attempts to halt the system
and it has a great number of nodes, the number of shards can be minimal, vise versa. The adjustment of shard number can be done in real time
following the rules of our approach so that we do not need to assume the adversary having n∕2 of nodes as like calculating the failure probability.
In Figure 7,we show theminimumpercentage of nodesmust be taken by the adversary to halt the entirety of the systemwith different number
of nodes and different number of shards.
As Figure 7 suggests, with a fixed number of nodes, by reducing the number of shards, the minimum percentage is increased. Thus, using the
halting recoverymechanism introduced in themodel, the systemwill eventually recover fromahaltwhen thenumberof shards reduced to thepoint
that can defect the adversary. The honest will alwayswin because the honest side has at least n/2+1 of nodes (themajority), thusmeeting the same
security level as theNakamoto blockchain. As the rules discussed, T in every shard is adjusted to keep a 10−6 failure chance assuming the adversary
has n/2-1 of the nodes. Thismechanism guarantees that themaximumchance to control a shardwhen the adversary has nomore than 50$ of nodes
is 10−6 with any possible number of shards existed.
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Inorder to get a block acceptedby the shard, this blockmust getT approvals inmnodesof this shard. In Figure8,we showT∕m in two systemsof
1500and20000nodes. For anadversaryblock tobeaccepted, the adversarymust getT nodes inside the shard. In Figure9,we showthepercentage
of nodes (T/M) the adversarymust take in order to guarantee an adversary block to be approved.
Figure 10 shows the transaction throughput per iterationwith different shards in two systems of 1500 nodes and 20000 nodes (while fulfilling
a 10−6 failure chance). Figure 11 shows the transaction throughput per iteration with the different number of nodes and shards (while fulfilling a
10−6 failure chance).We let every shard block contain 2000 transactions.
Let every block of a shard sized 1 Mbytes (2000 transactions), every node signs one block per iteration. Let a block header sized 150 bytes, a
transaction sized 500 bytes and a signature sized 512 bytes (a SHA256withECDSA signature and 256 bytes PoW nonce). Let the committee's block
Sizeblockcommittee ≈ 33∗n (contains all the 33 bytes public identity key of nodes). The quantified data requirementDR in every iteration is:
DR = Sizeblockheader × s + Sizetransaction × 2000 + Sizesignature ×m + SizeBlockcommittee + SizeBlockCurrent shard . (16)
Figures 12 and 13 show the data requirement paired to the situation of Figures 10 and 11.
5 CONCLUSION
In thisarticle,weshowedan improvedn∕2adversarynoderesistantBlockchainshardingapproach; solvedtheproblemofhaltingwhentheadversary
has a lower than n∕2 of nodes. In this way, making the Blockchain sharding approach reach both n∕2 tampering resistance and n∕2 halting resistant
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levels. It also makes the shard number become adjustable by the workload, and the workload per shard is balanced. With this improved approach,
theperformanceofDAOsystems canbeprimarily improvedwhile the security of them is sustained.Moredevices canbe added to the system,which
extends the usage and potential applications of the blockchain.
Weadmit thatwhenapplying large scale users to this approach, the adjustment of shardsmaybe frequent becauseof nodes can join in and leave
the shards frequently. We believe such adjustment can be reduced by node regulation especially through the mean of financial tools.17 In addition,
when therearemanyshards, cross-shardcommunicationcanbecomean issue for the systemandcausingunnecessaryverificationordataexchange,
the future work of this article should focus on design and implementing cross-shard communication protocol.
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